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The Confusing Language of McCulloch v.
Maryland:
Did Marshall Really Know What He Was
Doing (or Meant)?
Sanford Levinson1
All legal “interpretation” involves confrontation with
inherently indeterminate language. I have distinguished in my
own work between what I call the Constitution of Settlement and
the Constitution of Conversation. The former includes those
aspects of the Constitution that do indeed seem devoid of
interpretive challenge, such as the unfortunate assignment of two
senators to each state or the specification of the terms of office of
representatives, senators, and presidents. I am quite happy to
concede that “two,” “four,” and “six” have determinate meaning,
though my concession is not based on a fancy theory of
linguistics. It is, rather, a recognition that only in the most
unusual, perhaps even bizarre, circumstances would anyone raise
serious questions about their meaning. Around the seminar table,
contemplating the highest of high theories, one can
“problematize” all language; texts are never truly selfinterpreting. They could, after all, be written in a secret code to
which we must apply a key. But, pragmatically, we all “know”
what “two,” “four,” or “six” means, and we are even willing to
concede without further discussion that one measures the age
requirements for public officials against the solar rather than lunar
calendar. We can debate the wisdom of all of these constitutional
1. The original version of this essay was prepared for the wonderful gathering
organized by David Schwartz that took place in November at the University of Wisconsin
Law School in Madison. Mark Killenbeck, the author of an indispensable book on
McCulloch, served as a co-organizer and arranged for the publication of many of the papers
in the Arkansas Law Review, for which I am very grateful. Needless to say, this revised
version benefitted from comments received at the Madison gathering, as well as from
comments given to me by Mark Graber and Jack Balkin.
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requirements, as I am wont to do, but there is, practically
speaking, no serious debate about their meaning.
This is, obviously, in contrast with the parts of the
Constitution that the legal academy actually chooses to teach (and
obsess) about. Our students are not introduced to the Constitution
via the Veto Clause and its requirement for two-thirds of each
House to join in an override, or Article V’s requirement that threequarters of the states agree to ratify a given constitutional
amendment. A few of us may denounce both as giving way too
much power to entrenched minorities—and thus exemplifying
what I have criticized as “our undemocratic Constitution.” 2 Or, if
we are devotees of Bruce Ackerman (as I am), we might note the
way that the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment is in some
tension with the assumptions underlying Article V regarding the
freedom that the states might be thought to have to reject a
proffered proposal. 3 Still, I am confident that most of us spend
almost all of our professional time, especially in the classroom,
with materials that generate genuine controversies about
constitutional meaning as measured by the frequency with which
they are litigated. Interpretive approaches to the “majestic
generalities”4 of the Fourteenth Amendment take precedence over
any serious discussion of the actual provenance of the
Amendment in terms of the ostensible requirements of Article V. 5
What I want to do in this essay is to explore one such
interpretive controversy, which involves one of the truly key
words in the entire theological and political lexicon ”—
“sovereignty.”6 I increasingly realize that my entire introductory
course in constitutional law could be described as an extended
meditation on the term. And it is no coincidence at all that in
2018-19, I taught both a reading course at Harvard during the fall
semester and then a full-scale seminar at the University of Texas
2. See generally SANFORD LEVINSON, OUR UNDEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION: WHERE
THE CONSTITUTION GOES WRONG (AND HOW WE THE PEOPLE C AN CORRECT IT) (2006).
3. See 2 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: TRANSFORMATIONS 111 (2000).
4. Fay v. New York, 332 U.S. 261, 282 (1947).
5. But see PAUL BREST ET AL., PROCESSES OF CONSTITUTIONAL DECISIONMAKING
348-51 (7t ed. 2018), which, as in previous editions, does at least acknowledge the presence
of the Ackermanian question about the legitimacy of the Fourteenth Amendment as an
Article V amendment.
6. On the theological importance of “sovereignty,” see generally JEAN BETHKE
ELSHTAIN, SOVEREIGNTY: GOD, STATE, AND SELF (2008).
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Law School in the spring on the many controversies generated by
taking seriously the notion of “popular sovereignty” (especially
when combined with the prospect of Wilsonian “selfdetermination”). No idea has been more important—or, possibly,
generated more mischief—over the past three centuries.7
Given our general topic, and my own obsession with the
case, I shall, of course, be especially addressing McCulloch.8 But
it is crucial to begin with one prior case, which is left totally
unmentioned by John Marshall; indeed, he cites no cases
whatsoever in what can only be described as his truly monumental
“state paper” on the American constitutional order that goes well
beyond deciding the case at hand.9 Ignoring precedent is certainly
understandable in “cases of first impression,” where, by
definition, there are no relevant cases to draw on as potentially
authoritative. But, to put it mildly, the status of states as
“sovereign” was scarcely unexamined by 1819. It was the central
issue of the first important case decided in 1793 by the United
States Supreme Court, Chisholm v. Georgia.10 Unfortunately, it
has basically dropped out, assuming it was ever part of, the
pedagogical canon of constitutional law; perhaps because of our
tendency in the legal academy to treat John Marshall as if he were
the first (instead of the fourth) Chief Justice and therefore to
ignore anything the Court did prior to his arrival. This is a
fundamental error.
Anyone who takes seriously the notion of “sovereignty”—
and the role the term plays in American political and legal
discourse——must confront Chisholm. I would say, incidentally,
that this is especially true for ostensible originalists, who should
explain how it is that the 1793 Court—which included among its
members by all accounts one of the three most important
members first of the Philadelphia Convention and then the
Pennsylvania ratifying convention, James Wilson, as well as one
of the three authors of The Federalist, Chief Justice John Jay—

7. See Sanford Levinson, The Continuing Specter of Popular Sovereignty and National
Self-Determination in an Age of Political Uncertainty, in CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY IN
CRISIS? 651 (Mark A. Graber, Sanford Levinson & Mark Tushnet eds., 2018).
8. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316 (1819).
9. See id.
10. Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. 419 (1793).
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could have been so mistaken about the original public meaning of
what appears to the naïve as the plain text of the Constitution.
In any event, Chisholm involved the desire of the executor
of an estate in South Carolina to sue Georgia in federal court for
a debt clearly owed by the state with regard to purchases during
the Revolutionary War (or, as I prefer to call it, the Secession
from the British Empire).11 The state claimed “sovereign
immunity” from even having to answer the claim filed against it. 12
The Court then ruled by a vote of four to one, with James Iredell
of North Carolina writing in splendid isolation, that Georgia had
no such immunity.13 Two of the opinions, by Justices Blair and
Cushing, rested on what we would today call “textual argument.”
Thus Cushing writes as follows:
The judicial power . . . is expressly extended to
“controversies between a State and citizens of another
State.” . . . . The case, then, seems clearly to fall within the
letter of the Constitution. It may be suggested that it could
not be intended to subject a State to be a Defendant, because
it would effect the sovereignty of States. If that be the case,
what shall we do with the immediate preceding clause;
“controversies between two or more States,” where a State
must of necessity be Defendant? If it was not the intent, in
the very next clause also, that a State might be made
Defendant, why was it so expressed as naturally to lead to
and comprehend that idea? Why was not an exception made,
if one was intended?14

For anyone who professes to take text seriously—think, for
example, of the late Justice Scalia or the present Justice
Gorsuch—this would seem to be as close to a knock-down
argument as is imaginable. As textualists, including myself in my
“Constitution of Settlement” mode, are prone to ask, “what part
of ‘controversies between a State and citizens of another State’ do
you not understand?” But, as Justice Iredell, himself no secondrate intellect, suggested, states might claim to stand in the shoes
11.
12.
13.
14.

Id. at 420.
Id. at 419.
Id. at 420.
Id. at 467 (opinion of Cushing, J.).
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of the British Monarch, who certainly enjoyed sovereign
immunity.15 Moreover, one can even point to various statements
made by proponents of the Constitution, trying to wrest the votes
of wavering delegates justifiably concerned that the new
Constitution created a “consolidated government” that left states
as pitiful hulks of their formerly sovereign selves at the time of
the 1776 secession from the Empire or even prior to ratification
of the new Constitution. 16
So it is necessary (and proper) to turn to the truly remarkable
opinions of the first Chief Justice, John Jay, and then, perhaps
even more notably, of James Wilson, who in addition to his
practical importance at two conventions in Philadelphia, also
wrote the first great American treatise on law.17 I shall quote at
length from these opinions, in part reflecting my increasing
frustration by the actual paucity of time spent analyzing given
cases—including, importantly, McCulloch—even as we profess
to take cases seriously. But to take cases truly seriously requires
devotion of due time to their complexity, not to focus simply on
favorite paragraphs that turn out to be the equivalent of
soundbites. And it may well be that spending such time is far
more likely to reveal the inherent complexities and even
contradictions within a given opinion than to provide a confident
“rationale” that hapless students can write down in a brief of the
case. I usually tell my students that briefing cases is a waste of
time; or, to put it another way, if McCulloch could truly be
“briefed,” then why in the world should it be included in its
entirety, as it is, in the casebook that I co-edit or even the
relatively lengthy excerpts that are found in most casebooks?
There is a reason that I have devoted a twelve-hour reading course
at Harvard and the first half of the semester in a course at the
University of Texas to reading aloud Marshall’s opinion in its
entirety and stopping to discuss the important questions (often
begged) that can be found within almost literally every sentence.

15. Chisholm, 2 U.S. at 437 (opinion of Iredell, J.).
16. 30 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 553 (Barbara B. Oberg et al. eds., 2003)
(text of Kentucky Resolutions drafted anonymously by Jefferson).
17. Wilson’s lectures on law, together with other of his important writings, are
available in a well-produced, affordable two-volume edition published by the Liberty Fund,
edited by the late Kermit Hall, JAMES WILSON, COLLECTED WORKS OF JAMES WILSON
(Kermit L. Hall ed., 2007).
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The same could be done with Chisholm, and indeed practically
any of the truly significant cases within the canon.
“In determining the sense in which Georgia is a sovereign
State,” Jay writes, we must advert back “to the political situation
we were in . . . prior to the Revolution.”18 No doubt at that time,
“[a]ll the people of this country were then, subjects of the King of
Great Britain, and owed allegiance to him; and all the civil
authority then existing or exercised here, flowed from the head of
the British Empire,” as sovereign. 19 Indeed, at least through the
fateful execution of King Charles in 1649, monarchs claimed to
have derived their own sovereignty from Divine sovereignty. 20
Recall, in this context, Romans 13:1 and its proclamation that
magistrates are chosen by God and are, presumably, entitled to
the deference the faithful grant to the Ruler of the Universe. 21
Divine Right theories did not survive the Seventeenth Century, of
course. Not only did Cromwellites execute King Charles I in
1649; the Glorious Revolution of 1688, which sent James II into
exile and replaced him, by Parliamentary choice, with William
and Mary of the Netherlands, made it clear that the basis of
monarchical legitimacy was now rooted in some theory, however
evanescent, of popular (or at least parliamentary) acceptance. 22
What replaced monarchical sovereignty, save for ceremonial
references to the monarch as “sovereign,” was the sovereignty of
the British parliament. 23 That was, however, scarcely acceptable
to the American secessionists, who were almost pathetically
critical of King George III for his failure to veto what the colonists
claimed were overreaching laws passed by the Parliament. 24
18. Chisholm, 2 U.S. at 470 (opinion of Jay, C.J.).
19. Id.
20. See generally J. NEVILLE F IGGIS, T HE T HEORY OF THE DIVINE R IGHT OF KINGS
(2d ed. 1922).
21. As stated in the King James Version well known to English Protestants, “Let every
soul be subject unto the higher powers. For there is no power but of God: the powers that be
are ordained of God.” Romans 13:1 (King James).
22. See G. Edward White, 1 LAW IN AMERICAN HISTORY: FROM THE
COLONIAL YEARS THROUGH THE CIVIL WAR 115 (2012) (Glorious Revolution
“established the House of Common in Parliament as the principal law making body. . . The
theory of sovereignty animating the arrangement was that although formal sovereignty
remained vested in the monarch for some purposes, primary practical sovereignty, in the
form of lawmaking power, resided in Parliament.”).
23. Id.
24. See ERIC NELSON, THE ROYALIST REVOLUTION: MONARCHY AND THE
AMERICAN FOUNDING 64-65 (2014).
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They did not truly assimilate the reality that the royal veto power
had been, as a practical matter, eliminated, last exercised by
Queen Anne in 1709 and to disappear thereafter. 25 And no one
should believe that the colonists desired token representation,
even by elected representatives, in a Parliament that would
continue to view itself as possessing the power to pass whatever
tax legislation it wished to apply to America. 26 What they wanted
was independence from the tentacles of parliamentary
sovereignty, not token participation in its decisionmaking. 27
According to Jay, the Declaration “found the people already
united for general purposes.” 28 This is, after all, what allowed the
Declaration to open with the altogether debatable assertion that
the colonists were “one people” asserting their right to leave the
Empire. Jay had also asserted this proposition as one of the coauthors of The Federalist advocating replacement of the Articles
of Confederation by the Constitution. 29 “From the crown of Great
Britain, the sovereignty of their country,” that is, the United
States, or in some texts, the “united States,” “passed to the people
of it.”30 It should be noted, there is nothing innocent in the use of
“it” rather than “them.” Jay anticipated the all-important change,
following the carnage of 1861-65, from referring to the “United
States” in the plural to instead adopting the singular. Jay’s is a
precursor of the most nationalist version of Marshall’s later
opinion by asserting that “the people . . .. . . continued to consider
themselves, in a national point of view, as one people; and they
continued without interruption to manage their national concerns
accordingly.”31 They manifested this by making “a confederation
of the States, the basis of a general government.”32 However,
“[e]xperience disappointed the expectations they had formed
from it.”33 Several of the Framers, including Randolph and
Hamilton, denounced the Confederation government as
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.

Id. at 16; F.P. LOCK, EDMUND BURKE, VOLUME II: 1784-1797 67 (1998).
Nelson, supra note 24, at 37.
See id. at 109.
Chisholm, 2 U.S. at 470 (opinion of Jay, C.J.).
See SANFORD LEVINSON, AN ARGUMENT OPEN TO ALL: READING THE
FEDERALIST IN THE 21ST CENTURY 12-17 (2015) (discussing T HE FEDERALIST NO. 2 in which
John Jay enunciated the theme that Americans were “one people”).
30. Chisholm, 2 U.S. at 470 (opinion of Jay, C.J.).
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id.
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“imbecilic,”34 the rectification of which licensed the
extraordinary freedom displayed by the Convention with regard
to the seeming constraints imposed either by the Congressional
authorization for the Convention in the first place or, even more
dramatically, by the rigid rules of amendment presented by
Article XIII of the Articles of Confederation. In any event, Jay
tells us, “the people, in their collective and national capacity,
established the present Constitution.” 35
It is at this point that we reach what might be termed the
“money paragraph” in Jay’s opinion:
It is remarkable that in establishing it, the people exercised
their own rights, and their own proper sovereignty, and
conscious of the plenitude of it, they declared with becoming
dignity, “We the people of the United States, do ordain and
establish this Constitution.” Here we see the people acting as
sovereigns of the whole country; and in the language of
sovereignty, establishing a Constitution by which it was their
will, that the State Governments should be bound, and to
which the State Constitutions should be made to conform.
Every State Constitution is a compact made by and between
the citizens of a State to govern themselves in a certain
manner; and the Constitution of the United States is likewise
a compact made by the people of the United States to govern
themselves as to general objects in a certain manner. By this
great compact however, many prerogatives were transferred
to the national Government, such as those of making war and
peace, contracting alliances, coining money, etc. etc. 36

Could John Marshall possibly have put it any better? (That
he did not, as a matter of fact, is a primary topic of this paper.)
What we might even wish to describe as American
exceptionalism pervades Jay’s opinion inasmuch as he offers
America as a vivid contrast to the “feudal principles” that
continue to animate “the sovereignties in Europe, and particularly
in England.”37 There the Prince is considered “as the sovereign,
and the people as his subjects; it regards his person as the object
34.
35.
36.
37.

See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST NO. 15 (Alexander Hamilton).
Chisholm, 2 U.S. at 470 (opinion of Jay, C.J.).
Id. at 470-71.
Id.
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of allegiance, and excludes the idea of his being on an equal
footing with a subject, either in a Court of Justice or elsewhere.”38
It therefore easily follows that “such a sovereign could not be
amenable to a Court of Justice, or subjected to judicial controul
and actual constraint.”39 There is a further problem, of course,
which is that the monarch possesses “all the Executive powers,”
so that “the judgment of the Courts would, in fact, be only
monitory, not mandatory to him, and a capacity to be advised, is
a distinct thing from a capacity to be sued.”40 However, Jay
assures us, “No such ideas obtain here; at the Revolution, the
sovereignty devolved on the people; and they are truly the
sovereigns of the country, but they are sovereigns without
subjects (unless the African slaves among us may be so called)
and have none to govern but themselves; the citizens of America
are equal as fellow citizens, and as joint tenants in the
sovereignty.”41
What is “sovereignty”? It is, says Jay, “the right to
govern.”42 More accurately, perhaps, for Americans it is the right
to establish the terms of governance even as representatives
engage in the actual quotidian acts of governance. In Europe,
where “princes” are sovereign, “the sovereign actually
administers the Government; here [in America], never in a single
instance.”43 Instead, “our Governors are the agents of the
people,” “who are the actual sovereigns.44 As Richard Tuck
argues in his important book The Sleeping Sovereign, Jay fully
adopts an all-important distinction between sovereignty and
government.45 It is the people who establish the government,
which may or may not have limited powers.46 Hobbes powerfully
argued that a sovereign people would in fact choose to adopt what
most of us would describe as a tyrannical Leviathan state as the
sole way of escaping the otherwise “nasty, brutish, and short” life
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.

Id.
Id.
Chisholm, 2 U.S. at 471 (opinion of Jay, C.J.).
Id. at 471-72.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See generally R ICHARD TUCK, THE S LEEPING SOVEREIGN: T HE INVENTION OF
MODERN DEMOCRACY (2015).
46. Chisholm, 2 U.S. at 472 (opinion of Jay, C.J.).
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presented in an insufficiently governed natural state. 47 It may be
that such a government possesses, as a practical matter, the
powers that we associate with “sovereignty.” But as an analytical
matter, we should continue to distinguish between the “real
sovereign,” even if (s)he should be sleeping, and the government
that is created by the sovereign. After all, at least under some
circumstances, it is possible that the sleeping sovereign might
arise from bed and invoke all of the necessarily retained powers
of sovereignty set out, for example, in the Declaration of
Independence.
What this all adds up to is the clear liability of a state within
the Union to be sued by a citizen of another state inasmuch as no
government can claim itself to be “sovereign.” The clear text
rests on a profound political theory, which indeed distinguishes
the New Order being established by Americans from the “feudal”
one being left blessedly behind. Jay offers the equivalent of a
syllogism:
It is agreed, that one free citizen may sue another; the
obvious dictates of justice, and the purposes of society
demanding it. It is agreed, that one free citizen may sue any
number on whom process can be conveniently executed;
nay, in certain cases one citizen may sue forty thousand; for
where a corporation is sued, all the members of it are actually
sued, though not personally, sued.

The state is simply a peculiar kind of corporation, and no less
amenable to suit simply because it is called Georgia. Like
Cushing, he notes that “one State may sue another State in this
Court”48 without fatal insult to what Justice Kennedy would much
later dubiously insist is the “dignity” instantiated in being a State
within the Union. 49 So, Jay quite cleverly suggests that “[i]t is
not therefore to an appearance in this Court that the objection
points.”50 Instead, Georgia claims to be insulted by the lese

47.
48.
49.
50.

THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 115 (Lerner Publ’g Grp. 2018) (1651).
Id. at 473.
Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 715 (1999).
Chisholm, 2 U.S. at 473 (opinion of Jay, C.J.).
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majeste of being sued by a South Carolina citizen. 51 That would
be tenable if Georgia had, as Iredell seems to suggest, succeeded
to the status of George III. 52 But it did not. As Gerald Ford would
put it in 1974, “Here the [P]eople rule,”53 which means that states
can be sued as well as sue one another (and, just as importantly,
act as plaintiffs against individual citizens). To rule otherwise
would contradict and do violence to the great and leading
principles of a free and equal national government, one of
the great objects of which is, to ensure justice to all:—[t]o
the few against the many, as well as to the many against the
few. It would be strange, indeed, that the joint and equal
sovereigns of this country, should, in the very Constitution
by which they professed to establish justice, so far deviate
from the plain path of equality and impartiality, as to give to
the collective citizens of one State, a right of suing individual
citizens of another State, and yet deny to those citizens a
right of suing them. 54

Jay concludes his opinion with a tantalizing observation and
question: Does his argument extend to the ability of a citizen to
sue the United States itself?55 He concedes that it is “fair
reasoning” from his overall argument that that should be the
case.56 However, he explains that “the same principles of candour
which urge [him] to mention this objection also urge [him] to
suggest an important difference between the two cases.” 57 The
brute fact is that although federal courts might be expected to be
supported by the national executive with regard to judgments
against states, no same expectation can necessarily be enjoyed
with regard to “cases of actions against . . . the United States; . . .
[because] there is no power which the Courts can call to their aid.
From this distinction important conclusions are deducible, and
51. Id. (“It is not therefore to an appearance in this Court that the objection points. To
what does it point? It points to an appearance at the suit of one or more citizens.”).
52. Id. at 446 (opinion of Iredell, J.).
53. President Gerald R. Ford, Remarks at Swearing in Ceremony at The White House
(Aug. 9, 1974) (transcript available in the Ford Library Museum),
https://www.fordlibrarymuseum.gov/library/speeches/740001.asp.
54. Chisholm, 2 U.S. at 477 (opinion of Jay, C.J.).
55. See id.
56. Id. at 478.
57. Id.
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they place the case of a State, and the case of the United States,
in very different points of view.” 58
Perhaps one might regard this cautionary note as Bickelian
prudentialism avant la lettre.59 After all, the concern about what
might be termed an “unsympathetic executive” might be said to
be the fundamental concern that will explain Marbury v.
Madison60 only a decade later, when the “passive virtues” of what
many have perceived as Marshall’s capitulation to political reality
and Jeffersonian power predominated to prevent William
Marbury from receiving the commission to which Marshall
clearly believed he was legally entitled. 61 Perhaps in the future,
Jay suggests, “the State of society [will be] so far improved, and
the science of Government advanced to such a degree of
perfection, as that the whole nation could in the peaceable course
of law, be compelled to do justice, and be sued by individual
citizens.”62 But in 1793 that is simply a dream. That the United
States itself may be able to escape its just legal deserts does not,
however, compel a similar conclusion with regard to Georgia.
Should we not already be convinced, James Wilson certainly
provides added reinforcement, especially rhetorically. He
describes the case as being one “of uncommon magnitude” owing
to the fact that “[o]ne of the parties to it is a State:—certainly
respectable, claiming to be sovereign.” 63 But a “claim” is not the
equivalent of the fact asserted, and Wilson devotes his opinion to
demolishing it.64
He begins by noting that “[t]o the Constitution of the United
States, the term SOVEREIGN, is totally unknown . . . . They
might have announced themselves ‘“SOVEREIGN’” people of
the United States: But serenely conscious of the fact, they avoided
the ostentatious declaration.” 65 One might wonder why that

58. Id.
59. See Alexander Bickel, Forward: The Passive Virtues, 75 HARV. L. REV. 40, 47
(1961) (explaining the techniques by which the United States Supreme Court avoids deciding
certain especially politically troublesome constitutional issues in order to preserve its own
institutional power).
60. See generally 5 U.S. 137 (1803).
61. Bickel, supra note 59, at 49-51.
62. Chisholm, 2 U.S. at 478 (opinion of Jay, C.J.).
63. Id. at 453 (opinion of Wilson, J.).
64. See id. at 453-66.
65. Id. at 454.
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would be “ostentatious,” 66 as distinguished from saying simply
that it was totally unnecessary given the opening of the Preamble.
In any case, for Wilson, the state should “be considered as
subordinate to the People . . . . The only reason, I believe, why a
free man is bound by human laws, is, that he binds himself.”67
Randy Barnett, one of the relatively few other analysts who
has paid such careful attention to Wilson’s opinion, uses this as
the basis for what I regard as a near-anarchic doctrine of
individual sovereignty. 68 But, at the very least, we might agree
that Wilson’s theory of popular sovereignty makes untenable any
theory of state sovereignty, whether in reference to Georgia or,
indeed, to the United States. Contrary to what Justice Kennedy
will later assert, “dignity” is possessed by free individuals, not by
artificial states. 69 Thus, Wilson writes, “[i]f the dignity of each
singly is undiminished; the dignity of all jointly must be
unimpaired. A State, like a merchant, makes a contract. A
dishonest State, like a dishonest merchant, willfully refuses to
discharge it: The latter is amenable to a Court of Justice: Upon
general principles of right, shall the former when summoned to
answer the fair demands of its creditor, be permitted, proteus-like,
to assume a new appearance, and to insult him and justice, by
declaring ‘I am a Sovereign state?’ Surely not.” 70 There may be
a prudential, “realist” response to Wilson, but is there a truly
principled one?
“In one sense,” writes Wilson, “the term ‘sovereign’ has for
its correlative, ‘subject. . .’” just as, we often argue today, “rights”
imply “duties.”71 But, he insists that this sense of “sovereignty”

66. Id.
67. Chisholm, 2 U.S. at 455-56 (opinion of Wilson, J.).
68. Randy Barnett, We the People: Each and Every One, 123 YALE L.J. 2576, 259799 (2014).
69. Chisholm, 2 U.S. at 455-56 (opinion of Wilson, J.) (“By a State I mean, a complete
body of free persons united together for their common benefit, to enjoy peaceably what is
their own, and to do justice to others. It is an artificial person. It has its affairs and its
interests . . . its rights . . . its obligations. It may acquire property distinct from that of its
members . . . incur debts to be discharged out of the public stock, not out of the private
fortunes of individuals. It may be bound by contracts; [and] for damages arising from the
breach of those contracts. In all our contemplations, however, concerning this feigned and
artificial person, we should never forget, that, in truth and nature, those, who think and speak,
and act, are men.”).
70. Id. at 456.
71. Id.
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“can receive no application” in the United States” for “[u]nder
th[e] Constitution there are citizens, but no subjects.”72 What
about states? Does that make a difference? “[S]ome writers”
assert that “every State, which governs itself without any
dependence on another power, is a sovereign State.”73 However,
Wilson is truly committed to the constitutional guarantee, in the
constitutional text, that each State possess a Republican Form of
Government.74 So what does that mean?
[M]y short definition of such a Government is,—one
constructed on this principle, —that the Supreme Power
resides in the body of the people. As a Judge of this Court, I
know, and can decide upon the knowledge, that the citizens
of Georgia, when they acted upon the large scale of the
Union, as a part of the “People of the United States,” did not
surrender the Supreme or sovereign Power to that State; but,
as to the purposes of the Union, retained it to themselves. As
to the purposes of the Union, therefore, Georgia is NOT a
sovereign State. If the Judicial decision of this case forms
one of those purposes; the allegation, that Georgia is a
sovereign State, is unsupported by the fact.75

Wilson goes on to cite the plain words of Article III, as well
as the purposes of the Constitution set out in the Preamble, and
demonstrates that both parts of the Constitution support rejecting
any claim of sovereign immunity by Georgia. 76
As is well known, the Eleventh Amendment overruled
Chisolm.77 But, as John Manning has well argued, the language
of that Amendment is remarkably limited to the specifics of the
case itself, i.e., the suit by an out-of-state citizen against a state. 78
It in no way adopts any general declaration (or even presumption)

72. Id.
73. RANDY E. BARNETT & JOSH BLACKMAN, CONSTITUTIONAL L AW: C ASES IN
CONTEXT 84 (3d ed. 2018).
74. Chisholm, 2 U.S. at 457 (opinion of Wilson, J.).
75. Id.
76. Id. at 474-75.
77. See, e.g., Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 11 (1890); John F. Manning, The Eleventh
Amendment and the Reading of Precise Constitutional Texts, 113 YALE L.J. 1663, 1667
(2004).
78. See Manning, supra note 77, at 1680–83.
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of state sovereignty. 79 We are also invited to ask whether the
Amendment overruled a clearly incorrect decision, as appears to
be believed by the current majority of the Supreme Court, 80 or
instead, changed the meaning of the Constitution itself by
overriding what was clearly a correct reading of the 1787
Constitution.81 As you might suspect, I would argue that the latter
is clearly the case. Or, let me put it this way: If Georgia is a
sovereign state in any truly serious sense, then we should
recognize, among other things, the potential legitimacy of its
secession, on behalf of the “one people” of Georgia, from the
Union in 1861, just as the “one people” of the United States
seceded from the British Empire in 1776. “Sovereignty” is not a
term that should be bandied about as if its meaning can be easily
cabined.
So, at long last we turn to the object of our gathering, what I
believe is the single most important, and perhaps mysterious,
opinion in our entire canon: McCulloch v. Maryland.82 I begin,
as is doubly appropriate, with the very first sentence, which
begins “In this case now to be determined, [Maryland], a
sovereign State . . . .”83 I have for many years been perplexed
why Marshall, an unusually skilled rhetorician, chose to begin the
opinion this way. After all, if one takes a traditional view of what
sovereignty entails—i.e., the power of ruling and not being ruled
in return84—then the obvious message of the case, particularly its
second part, dealing with the power to tax the Bank of the United
States, is that Maryland in no serious sense is a “sovereign state”
(just as so-called “Kentucky colonels” like Harlan Sanders are in
fact not “colonels” in the U.S. military). It may be the case that
Maryland was once a sovereign state, upon, say, gaining
independence via the Treaty of Paris in 1783 that recognized the
existence of the thirteen independent American states. We do
continue to call former office-holders by their title, so that at
present there are Presidents Carter, Clinton, Bush, and Obama in
addition to President Donald J. Trump. But, for better or worse,
79. See id. at 1682–83.
80. See id. at 1728 n.246.
81. See id. at 1739–41.
82. 17 U.S. 316 (1819).
83. Id. at 400 (emphasis added). I will generally place any reference to “sovereign”
or “sovereignty” in boldface.
84. See Sovereignty, BLACK’S L AW D ICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
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only the last in this series can exercise any of the Article II powers
assigned to presidents or other powers delegated by Congress.
The other former presidents know not to confuse the honorific use
of a former title with an acknowledgment of even an iota of legal
power. So was Marshall simply using the term “sovereign” with
regard to Maryland as an honorofic reminder of past glory but not
otherwise to be taken as indicative of any genuine legal power?
One might well view the power to tax (like the power to
wage war) as the sine qua non of sovereignty. Not insignificantly,
after all, it was the King’s alleged power to tax in the absence of
parliamentary acquiescence that triggered the English Revolution
in 1642 and the similar allegation of British parliamentary power
to levy stamp and tea taxes, among others, on the colonists in
America that triggered the secession and creation of the United
States of America. 85 Any look at McCulloch reveals that
Maryland has no power to wage war or, importantly, even to enter
into treaties with foreign countries, and the case stands for the
proposition that the power to tax is limited as well. 86 This is
obvious from a simple reading of the text, especially Article I,
Section 10, concerning the possibility of imposing tariffs or
inspections fees. But it is either Marshall’s genius or audacity to
imply a further prohibition on the taxing power of the purportedly
“sovereign” state, drawn not from the text of the Constitution, but
instead from what he identifies as the “texture” of the document. 87
In fact, as Marshall is well aware, Federalist 32 contains a long
discussion of the concurrent powers of both the states and the
national government to engage in taxation, with the concomitant
suggestion that the inevitable clashes that would arise would be
settled politically and, most definitely, not by reference to
ostensibly legalistic constraints contained in the Constitution. 88
Marshall essentially declares that the Federalist is irrelevant. 89
Again, one can wonder about the actual reality of “originalism”
in explaining American constitutional development.

85. See, e.g., Christopher Hibbert, CAVALIERS AND ROUNDHEADS: THE
ENGLISH CIVIL WAR 1642-1649 (1994).
86. McCulloch, 17 U.S. at 316.
87. Id. at 426.
88. THE FEDERALIST No. 32 (Alexander Hamilton).
89. See McCulloch, 17 U.S. at 433–35.
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Moreover, the absence of any reference to Chisholm is
especially perplexing. Is it sufficient to say either that it was
decided a full quarter century prior to the 1819 decision
considering the Bank (and Maryland’s attempt to tax it)? Or is
Marshall implicitly interpreting the Eleventh Amendment, which
is never mentioned in the slightest, given its utter formal
irrelevance to the case, as fundamentally overruling the opinions
of both Jay and Wilson and not merely the particular holding that
a state can be sued by a citizen of another state? But why would
he do that?
It was suggested in the Madison gathering that the first
sentence might have been written as it was in order to assure the
vote of a possibly recalcitrant colleague. There is no evidence for
this. More to the point, it would be quite stunning if any member
of the Court genuinely doubted the constitutionality of the Bank,
given that Madison himself had signed the renewal in 1816. And,
as already suggested, the important declaration in Part II, that
Maryland’s tax was unconstitutional, is at complete odds with the
description of the State as “sovereign.” 90 A justice who
demanded the inclusion of the adjective in sentence one would be
hard-pressed to explain acquiescence to the way that Marshall
almost eviscerates the ostensible concession in the course of the
opinion.
Not surprisingly, the next string of appearances of the term
occurs in paragraphs 7-11, which deal with what might be called
the ontology of the Union. That is, what is the basis of the Union?
How was it created? We get one distinct creation story in both
Jay’s and Wilson’s opinions. By 1798, Madison and Jefferson,
although authors of the Declaration of Independence, have
offered, in the Virginia and Kentucky Resolutions, respectively,
very different creation myths in which state sovereignty can
indeed be thought to be central. 91 And, for that matter, one can
90. See supra text accompanying note 89.
91.
For
the
texts
of
these
seminal
documents
see,
https://billofrightsinstitute.org/founding-documents/primary-source-documents/virginiaand-kentucky-resolutions/. For a brilliant analysis of some of the crucial differences between
Madison and Jefferson, particularly with regard to the notion of “nullification,” see Jonathan
Gienapp, How to Maintain a Constitution: The Virginia and Kentucky Resolutions and
James Madison’s Struggle with the Problem of Constitutional Maintenance, in SANFORD
LEVINSON,
ED.,
NULLIFICATION
AND
SECESSION IN
MODERN
CONSTITUTIONAL THOUGHT 53 (2016).
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see precursors of the Kentucky and Virginia Resolutions in
Federalist 39, where Publius (Madison) is attempting to square
the circle of describing the nature of the American republic. 92 Not
surprisingly, Marshall notes that:
the counsel for the State of Maryland have deemed it of some
importance, in the construction of the constitution, to
consider that instrument not as emanating from the people,
but as the act of sovereign and independent States. The
powers of the general government, it has been said, are
delegated by the States, who alone are truly sovereign; and
must be exercised in subordination to the States, who alone
possess supreme dominion. 93

The gauntlet clearly being thrown down by the (sovereign?)
State of Maryland, Marshall immediately indicates that “[i]t
would be difficult to sustain this proposition.” 94 Whatever role
the States might have played in selecting the delegates who
attended the Philadelphia Convention is now irrelevant. 95 After
all, “the instrument, when it came from their hands, was a mere
proposal, without obligation, or pretensions to it.” 96 They had no
authority to “adopt” the Constitution; in no way did the
Convention view itself as what would come to be called a
“constituent power.”97
Instead, and crucially, the
recommendation adopted on September 17, 1787, “was reported
to the then existing Congress of the United States, with a request
that it might ‘be submitted to a Convention of Delegates, chosen
in each State by the people thereof, under the recommendation of
its Legislature, for their assent and ratification.’” 98 For Marshall,
this is equivalent to submitting the text “to the people,” the
presumptive sovereigns. 99 He then dances around the issue of
whether they were “the people” of the entire United States, as
insisted upon by Jay especially, or “the people” of their particular
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.

THE FEDERALIST NO. 39 (James Madison).
McCulloch, 17 U.S. at 402 (emphasis added).
Id. at 403.
See id.
Id.
Id.
McCulloch, 17 U.S. at 403.
Id.
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states, who retained that identity throughout. 100 “It is true,”
Marshall admits, that “they assembled in their several States—
and where else should they have assembled? No political dreamer
was ever wild enough to think of breaking down the lines which
separate the States, and of compounding the American people into
one common mass.”101 Of course one might suggest that Jay and
Wilson were precisely such “dreamers,” at least conceptually, for
what else can “one people” mean if not some version of a
“common mass.” However, Marshall writes, and the key question
is whether this is a fundamental concession or something else,
“Of consequence, when they act, they act in their States. But the
measures they adopt do not, on that account, cease to be the
measures of the people themselves, or become the measures of
the State governments.”102
It is “[f]rom these Conventions” that “the constitution
derives its whole authority. The government proceeds directly
from the people,” who have the capacity to “‘‘ordain[] and
establish[]’” a new political order “in the name of the people.” 103
Although “[t]he assent of the States, in their sovereign capacity,”
might have been inferred through their ability to call a
Convention, and even agreeing to submit the proposed
Constitution “to the people,” Marshall emphasizes that “the
people were at perfect liberty to accept or reject it; and their act
was final. It required not the affirmance, and could not be
negatived, by the State governments. The constitution, when thus
adopted, was of complete obligation, and bound the State
sovereignties.”104 At the moment they were “bound,” it seems
fair to suggest, they were no longer sovereign in any truly
meaningful sense. They might have possessed certain retained
powers, of course, but those were the result of recognition by what
might be termed the “true sovereign,” i.e., the people who
“ordained and established” the Constitution that created the new
national government and announced formal supremacy over the
formerly sovereign state governments. From this perspective,
there is one sovereign—”We the People”—and two levels of
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.

Id. at 403-05.
Id.
Id.
McCulloch, 17 U.S. at 403.
Id. at 404 (emphasis added).
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government who have only such powers either assigned or
recognized by the sovereign people.
“It has been said,” Marshall writes, and, of course, one
wonders about who exactly has said this, “that the people had
already surrendered all their powers to the State sovereignties,
and had nothing more to give.”105“ He is not impressed.
But, surely, the question whether they may resume and
modify the powers granted to government does not remain
to be settled in this country. Much more might the legitimacy
of the general government be doubted, had it been created by
the States. The powers delegated to the State sovereignties
were to be exercised by themselves, not by a distinct and
independent sovereignty, created by themselves. To the
formation of a league, such as was the confederation, the
State sovereignties were certainly competent. But when, “in
order to form a more perfect union,” it was deemed
necessary to change this alliance into an effective
government, possessing great and sovereign powers, and
acting directly on the people, the necessity of referring it to
the people, and of deriving its powers directly from them,
was felt and acknowledged by all. The government of the
Union, then . . . is emphatically, and truly, a government of
the people. In form and in substance, it emanates from them.
Its powers are granted by them . . . . It is the government of
all; its powers are delegated by all. 106

Although one hesitates to describe this paragraph as a model
of clarity, it does appear that the constituent power is placed in a
collective (and ontologically singular) people who create the
“constituted powers” that are placed in both national and state
governments. For better or, I believe, for worse, Marshall is not
done with his display of what might be called “sovereignty talk.”
The further instances are as follows:
. . . [T]he power of creating a corporation, is one
appertaining to sovereignty, and is not expressly conferred
on Congress. This is true. But all legislative powers

105. Id. (emphasis added).
106. Id. at 404-05 (emphasis added).
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appertain to sovereignty . . . . The creation of a corporation,
it is said, appertains to sovereignty. This is admitted. But
to what portion of sovereignty does it appertain. . .? In
America, the powers of sovereignty are divided between the
government of the Union, and those of the States. They are
each sovereign, with respect to the objects committed to it,
and neither sovereign, with respect to the objects committed
to the other . . . . [H]ad the people conferred on the general
government the power contained in the constitution, and on
the States the whole residuum of power, would it have been
asserted, that the government of the Union was not
sovereign, with respect to those objects which were
entrusted to it . . . ? If this could not have been asserted, we
cannot well comprehend the process of reasoning which
maintains, that a power appertaining to sovereignty cannot
be connected with that vast portion of it which is granted to
the general government . . .107 The good sense of the public
has pronounced, without hesitation, that the power of
punishment appertains to sovereignty, and may be exercised
whenever the sovereign has a right to act, as incidentally to
his constitutional powers. It is a means for carrying into
execution all sovereign powers. . ..108
That the power of taxing [the bank] by the States may be
exercised so as to destroy it, is too obvious to be denied. But
taxation is said to be an absolute power, which acknowledges
no other limits than those expressly prescribed in the
constitution, and like sovereign power of every other
description, is intrusted to the discretion of those who use it.
But the very terms of this argument admit, that the
sovereignty of the State, in the article of taxation itself, is
subordinate to, and may be controlled by the constitution of
the United States.109
If we measure the power of taxation residing in a State, by
the extent of sovereignty which the people of a single state
possess, and can confer on its government, we have an
intelligible standard, applicable to every case to which the

107. Id. at 409-11 (emphasis added).
108. McCulloch, 17 U.S. at 418 (emphasis added).
109. Id. at 427 (emphasis added).
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power may be applied . . . . We are relieved, as we ought to
be, from clashing sovereignty . . . .110

So it is at this point that I can ask the question that genuinely
mystifies me: What, if anything, is gained by the use of the term
“sovereignty” in the paragraphs immediately above, that would
not be present if instead we simply used the word “government”
perhaps accompanied by the adjective “effective” or, to use a fine
18th-century term, “efficacious”? As Marshall himself insists,
one should read the Constitution to provide for just such a
government, given the dismal experience under the Articles of
Confederation.111 One can even read the Constitution, should one
wish, to provide for certain protections for the sub-national
governments whose functional importance is recognized by the
sovereign People. But one can say all of this without ever once
using the word “sovereignty” to refer to the powers of
government, as against those appertaining to the pouvoir
constituent.
I have been teaching McCulloch now for some forty years.
I once thought I truly understood what Marshall was saying. But
now I find myself wondering. It is not, incidentally, that I think
there is a singular meaning awaiting us if only we can crack the
code contained within the language that Marshall uses. Indeed, I
was critical several years ago of a long essay that our host, David
Schwartz, had published that I thought had made just such an
assertion.112 I am delighted that his really fine forthcoming book
on the case appears to recant, not by asserting a different “one true
meaning,” but rather by suggesting that, perhaps like the epic
poem the opinion in some sense really is, it resists reduction to
any one message. 113 Indeed, it appears to invite various
deconstructionist moves, insofar as one seeming assertion, such
as the ontological status of Maryland as “a sovereign State,” that
are so clearly undercut by depriving it of the basic right to tax as
it wishes, subject, as suggested in Federalist 32, only to political
110. Id. at 429-30 (emphasis added).
111. Id. at 406-07.
112. See generally David S. Schwartz, Misreading McCulloch v. Maryland, 18 U. P A.
J. CONST. L. 1 (2015).
113. DAVID SCHWARTZ, THE SPIRIT OF THE CONSTITUTION: JOHN MARSHALL AND
THE 200-YEAR ODYSSEY OF MCCULLOCH V. MARYLAND (forthcoming August 2019).
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resistance, but not at all to the legalized invalidation that is the
message contained in Part II of the decision. 114
One could make the same observations about the status of
the national government as possessing only “limited powers.”
Well, yes, he does say this, but then one has to confront the
(possible) meanings of paragraph 38, not to mention the meanings
he assigns the words “necessary and proper.” And then there is
paragraph 42, in which we are assured, with whatever degree of
sincerity we might assign, that the Court will always stand ready
to monitor merely pretextual use of what would otherwise be
within the assigned powers.
McCulloch helps to structure much of the basic language we
use to analyze constitutional questions. Unfortunately, it
bequeathed to us a completely muddled and perhaps
incomprehensible notion of “sovereignty” that Marshall insists on
using, not, of course, for the first time. Mark Killenbeck
discusses some other uses of the term by Marshall. In Fletcher v.
Peck,115 for example, where the Court for the first time
invalidated a state statute on constitutional grounds, Marshall
observed that Georgia could have rescinded the land grants in
question (which were procured by massive fraud and a corrupt
state legislature) were the state “a single sovereign power.” 116
But, of course, it was not, and the attempted rescission fell victim
to either the Contract Clause or a more “general” reading of the
Constitution to impose limits drawn from the theory of republican
government on the State. 117 Similarly, another case, Sturges (or
Sturgis)118 v. Crowninshield,119 decided almost at the very same
time as McCulloch, saw Marshall invalidating the New York
State bankruptcy law that would have discharged an antecedent
debt.120
Although New York was “in most respects,
sovereign,”121 that did not extend to what Marshall viewed as the
violation of the Contract Clause by allowing a party, via a state
bankruptcy provision, to evade complying with the contractual
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.

Id.
Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. 87 (1810).
Id. at 136.
See id. at 135-37.
See Mark Killenbeck, M’Culloch in Context (forthcoming 2019).
Sturges v. Crowninshield, 17 U.S. 122 (1819).
Id. at 208.
Id. at 192-93.
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obligation.122 If one takes Marshall’s language seriously, one has
not only degrees of sovereignty, but also the continued suggestion
that it is New York that is sovereign rather than, importantly, “We
the People” who construct the governments within the overall
polity and determine what powers they actually enjoy.
One of the most serious problems faced by legal
academicians is that we are the prisoners of the language used, for
whatever reasons, by the Supreme Court. With regard to the hash
the Court has made of the term “diversity” concerning the use of
race in governmental decisions, I have suggested that the Court
should simply be analogized to Simon in the children’s game
“Simon Says.”123 Even less charitably, one can perhaps view the
Court as having taken on the role of Humpty Dumpty in the
freedom it sometimes asserts to offer idiosyncratic definitions of
terms that pervade important works of political and social theory
about which the Court professes, probably all too accurately, to
complete ignorance. Law students are rarely given explicit
training in the rich materials of political theory relevant to law.
And there is no reason at all to believe that those particular
lawyers who end up on the judiciary, including the Supreme
Court, make up for any such deficiencies in their education,
however otherwise talented some of them undoubtedly are.
In fact, with regard to Marshall, one can wonder, even after
conceding his obvious brilliance as a practicing lawyer, how deep
his formal education was, especially when compared with
Wilson, for example. Reviewing a recent biography of
Marshall,124 Judge Jed Rakoff notes that Marshall, unlike, for
example, Jefferson, “was largely self-taught and had no more than
one year of formal schooling.” 125 Although he did enroll in the
law curriculum at the College of William and Mary after his
distinguished service in the Revolutionary War, “he lasted only
six weeks before dropping out.” 126 Rakoff concedes that these
122. Id. at 208.
123. See Sanford Levinson, Diversity, 2 U. PENN. J. CON. L. 573, 578 (2000),
reprinted in Sanford Levinson, WRESTLING WITH D IVERSITY 11 (2003).
124. Joel Richard Paul, WITHOUT PRECEDENT: CHIEF JUSTICE JOHN MARSHALL
AND H IS T IMES (2018).
125. See Jed S. Rakoff, Hail to the Chief, N.Y. REV. BOOKS (Nov. 22, 2018),
https://www.nybooks.com/articles/2018/11/22/john-marshall-hail-chief/
[https://perma.cc/U2AX-R7J6].
126. Id.
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“limited foundations” nonetheless allowed Marshall to build “a
command of the law,” coupled with a skill in advocacy, “that
quickly made him a leader of the Virginia Bar.” 127 One can
readily agree while, at the same time, believing that perhaps
someone better trained would have been more careful in his
almost casual use of the term “sovereign.” After all, we know
that Marshall wrote Joseph Story in 1821, only two years after
McCulloch, that the “tendency of things” in his home state of
Virginia “verges rapidly to the destruction of the government and
the re-establishment of a league of sovereign states.”128 Did he
not recognize that his own questionable use of the loaded
language of “sovereignty” might have contributed to this
tendency?
Justice Kagan wrote with disarming candor in Puerto Rico
v. Sanchez Valle,129 which deals with the status of Puerto Rico in
the context of the “dual sovereignty” theory of criminal liability
that allows punishment for the same overt acts by both state and
national levels of government, that “[t]ruth be told, however,
‘sovereignty’ in this context does not bear its ordinary
meaning . . . . In short, the inquiry (despite its label) does not
probe whether a government possesses the usual attributes, or acts
in the common manner, of a sovereign entity.” 130 Lawyers must
in effect forget what some of them might in fact have learned from
the study of political theory and instead embrace the
specialized—and confusing—language of the law, especially as
declared by the Supreme Court. Similarly, Justice Thomas in turn
had undoubtedly been correct in the earlier case of United States
v. Lara131 when describing the language used by the Court (and
therefore by legal academics in thrall to such language) to
describe the status of American Indian tribes as
“schizophrenic.”132 As he writes, “[i]t is quite arguably the
127. Id.
128. Id.; Marshall to Story, quoted in William E. Dodd, Chief Justice Marshall and
Virginia, 1813-1821, 12 AM. HIST. REV. 777 (1904); see also Matt Steilen, A VIRGINIA
PERSPECTIVE ON MCCULLOCH 26 (2018) (unpublished manuscript, on file with The
Arkansas Law Review). Incidentally, Professor Steilen took exception to my suggestion that
Marshall might have been inadequately educated, at least with regard to the complexities of
“sovereign” and “sovereignty.”
129. 136 S. Ct. 1863 (2016)
130. Id. at 1870.
131. 541 U.S. 193 (2004).
132. Id. at 219.
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essence of sovereignty not to exist merely at the whim of an
external government.”133 He therefore concludes by plaintively
suggesting that “until we begin to analyze these questions
honestly and rigorously, the confusion that I have identified will
continue to haunt our cases.” 134
A central meta-issue is what would constitute an “honest and
rigorous” analysis of a term like “sovereignty.” Would it draw on
the literature of trained political theorists (some of whom have
suggested that the term should in fact be banished from discourse
given the conflicting definitions proffered by different theorists)
or treated as part of the “autonomous” language of the law, which
need not concern itself with the professional discourses of
others.135 One might suggest that the “haunting” alluded to by
Justice Thomas owes a great deal to Marshall’s altogether
confusing use of language in McCulloch and, of course, his later
opinions in what has come to be known as the “Marshall trilogy”
of cases dealing with the rights of American Indians, where
Marshall wrestles with the degree to which Indian tribes that
wish, like the American colonists vis-à-vis the British, to be
independent, retain measures of “sovereignty” even as they have
become “domestic dependent nations” under the power of the
decidedly alien United States government.136 It should not be
surprising that American Indian tribes and First Peoples of
Canada are resistant to the desiccated notion of “sovereignty”

133. Id. at 218.
134. Id. at 226.
135. See, in this context, Chief Justice Roberts’s opinion in Nat’l Fed’n of Ind. Bus. v.
Sibelius, 567 U.S. 519, 555 (2012), where he almost contemptuously dismisses the rich
philosophical literature on the act-omission distinction as mere “metaphysics” of no interest
to the practicing lawyer. His musings in the second part of the decision, dealing with the
conditions placed upon states should they wish to continue enrollment in the existing
Medicaid programs, pay equally little attention to the philosophical literature on the meaning
of “coercion.” See id. at 582-87. One could, of course, make a similar point with regard to
the Justices’ use of historical materials in their assertions about, say, “original meanings.”
See generally Martin S. Flaherty, History “‘Lite”‘ in Modern American Constitutionalism,
95 COLUM. L. REV. 523 (1995).
136. See Johnson v. M’Intosh, 21 U.S 543 (1823) (legitimizing conquest of Indian
lands basically on principle that might makes legal right); Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30
U.S 1 (1831) (denying foreign statehood status to Cherokee Nation as a requisite to invoking
original jurisdiction between the U.S. Supreme Court to claim Georgia’s violation of
Cherokee’s protected sovereign rights); Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S 515 (1832) (resisting
Georgia’s, as distinguished from the national government’s, claim to jurisdiction over
Cherokee territory).

2019

THE CONFUSING LANGUAGE

33

imposed by their conquerors. A quite stunning collection of
paintings by a Canadian First Nations artist, Lawrence Paul
Yuxweluptun, collected under the title Unceded Territories,
includes one painting entitled “Guardian Spirits on the Land:
Ceremony of Sovereignty,” and another one, entitled “An Indian
Game (Juggling Books” that includes references to books on
“Indian Country” and “Nation to Nation: Aboriginal Sovereignty
and the Future of Canada.”137
It is a standard observation within literary theory that what
explains the staying power of classics within the canon is that they
are subject to multiple interpretations. New theses can still be
written about Hamlet or King Lear. Are we really confident we
know whether God or Satan is the true “hero” of Paradise Lost?
How should we assess Starbuck’s conduct as First Mate on the
ill-fated Pequod in relation to Ahab’s obsessive search for Moby
Dick? And so on. Similarly, what accounts for the continuing
fascination of McCulloch is that the conversation about what in
the world it “really means” and stands for will never end, not least
because it raises questions that are absolutely central to the project
of the American republic but are never definitively answered
within the four corners of the proffered opinion. Whether this is
a comfort, either to us or to our students to whom we “introduce”
the case, may be another matter.

137. See LAWRENCE P AUL Y UXWELUPTUN: UNCEDED TERRITORIES 76, 81 (Karen
Duffek & Tania Willard, eds., 2016).

